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It’s Elementary
A Column by Emily Gutierrez (CPR Graduate Associate) and John Yinger (EFAP Director)
February 2018

How Fair Is the New York State Education Aid System?

The 2018-19 Executive Budget proposed by New York Governor Andrew Cuomo calls for
a $337.63 million increase in funding for the state’s foundation aid to public schools. 1 This
increase, which is just short of 2%, falls far short of the increase necessary to fully fund the
foundation formula that was supposed to be phased in starting in 2007. Indeed, the New York
Association of School Business Officials (NYASBO) estimates that a full phase in would cost $4.2
billion, which is over twelve times the increase in the Executive Budget.2 Moreover, the
Executive Budget continues the process of chipping away at local control over their foundation
aid by increasing the “set-aside” for community schools. 3 To be specific, the Executive Budget
increases this set aside from $150 to $200 million. A foundation formula is intended to provide
school districts with unrestricted funds. This set-aside transforms some of the foundation aid
into a categorical grant that must be spent on a specific purpose—in this case on turning
schools into community “hubs.”
These proposals obviously do not significantly alter the distribution of funds across
school districts or the share of funds that go to districts with the greatest needs. The question
we address in this memo is whether New York’s existing state aid system, including foundation
aid and other aid programs, adequately recognizes the extra spending and revenue
requirements of high-need districts. If the answer is negative, elected officials in New York may
want to consider more help for needy districts than is provided by the proposals in the
Executive Budget.
Our analysis is an extension of the material in our column for November 2017, which
addressed the issue of spending weights for at-risk students. For that column we gathered data
for school districts in New York for 2011 through 2015, the most recent year for which
Information on the Executive Budget comes from New York Division of the Budget’s “Description of
2018-19 New York State Executive Budget Recommendations for Elementary and Secondary Education”,
available at: https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy19/exec/fy19local/school/1819schoolaid.pdf
2
New York State Association of School Business Officials, “A Comparison of School Aid Proposals for
2018-19: NYSASBO, Regents, and
Executive.” https://www.nysasbo.org/uploads/files/1518114622_201819%20State%20Aid%20Proposals%20-%20ASBO%20-%20Regents%20Executive.pdf
3
The foundation aid formula also includes smaller set-asides for magnet schools and teacher support in
some districts.
1

complete data were available. Then we estimated the added costs associated with students in
poverty, students with limited English proficiency, and students with a severe disability. The
education aid formula in New York and in many other states places additional weight on at-risk
students to account for their added costs. We found that the weights in the 2007 foundation
formula were a big step in the right direction but still leave many districts short of the funds
they need to compensate them for the added costs of at-risk students.
In this column we shift to a broader view. To be specific, we compare a district’s total
state education aid with a comprehensive measure of its fiscal health. In this context, fiscal
health is defined as a district’s ability to deliver a given level of educational quality at a given tax
rate on its residents, based on factors outside the district’s control. Our measure of fiscal health
follows the logic of a foundation aid formula.4 It equals the amount a district must spend to
meet the state’s student performance target (expenditure need) minus the amount of money
the district can raise at a given level of sacrifice by its residents (revenue-raising capacity).
Our first step is to determine each district’s relative costs. These costs include the
higher costs of educating students from poor families, with limited English proficiency, or with
special needs, which were the focus of our November 2017 column. They also reflect the
higher wages that some districts must pay to attract teachers, holding teacher quality constant,
and the economies or diseconomies of enrollment scale in each district. 5 These cost factors are
all determined from the estimation of an education cost function, which is a well-known
technique used by scholars in education finance. 6 The net effect of all these cost factors is
summarized by a cost index, which equals 1.0 in the average district and, for example, 1.5 in a
district where costs are 50% higher than average. As discussed below, this cost index must be
multiplied by a spending target in the average district to determine expenditure need.
Our second step is to calculate the amount of money a district could raise using the
principal local funding source for public education in New York, namely, the property tax.
Because the property tax rate in the average district in New York is about 1.5%, we set the
Our fiscal health calculations and associated foundation aid formula follow the same philosophy as the
New York foundation aid formula, but, as discussed below, the details are not the same.
5
Costs per pupil are relatively high in very small districts. Some districts could lower these costs through
consolidation. See William D. Duncombe and John Yinger, 2010, “School District Consolidation: The
Benefits and Costs,” The School Administrator 67 (5) (May): pp. 10-17. We do not consider consolidation
in our calculations.
6
We use the same cost function estimation that is the basis for our November 2017 column. For scholarly
discussions of cost functions, see Duncombe, William D., Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, and John Yinger. 2015.
“Measurement of Cost Differentials.” In Handbook of Research in Education Finance and Policy, 2nd
Edition, M.E. Goertz and H.F. Ladd (eds.), New York: Routledge, pp. 260-278. For an earlier application to
New York, see Eom, Tae Ho, William D. Duncombe, Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, and John Yinger. 2014. “The
Unintended Consequences of Property Tax Relief: New York State’s STAR Program.” Education Finance
and Policy 9 (4) (Fall): 446-480.
4

expected local contribution at this level. In other words, the revenue-raising capacity
component of fiscal health is set at 1.5% of property wealth per pupil in each district. 7
Our third step is to determine New York State’s implicit spending target in the average
district, which is a component of expenditure need. Because our fiscal health measure is
equivalent to a foundation aid formula, we can measure the required state budget for a fiscalhealth-based foundation formula at any given spending target. The state’s implicit spending
target is the one that leads to the same state education aid budget with our foundation formula
as the actual state aid budget in 2015.
Figure 1 summarizes our results. This figure plots actual state aid (the vertical axis) and
district fiscal health (the horizontal axis) for all districts in New York State except New York
City. 8 It shows that actual state aid in New York is correlated with district fiscal health. In other
words, districts in poor fiscal health tend to receive more state aid per pupil than other
districts.
Nevertheless, three troubling lessons emerge from this figure. First, state aid does not
fully compensate low-health districts for their disadvantages. To be specific, a $1 increase in
the need-capacity gap leads to only a $0.62 increase in state aid. Moreover, the expected gap
between fiscal-health-based aid and actual aid per capita is $5,488 higher in a school district
with a 100 percent of its students eligible for a free lunch than in a school district with no
student poverty.
Second, many large and/or high-need districts receive far less aid than warranted by
their fiscal health. Actual aid falls short of fiscal-health based aid by $3,495 per pupil in
Rochester, $4,930 per pupil in Syracuse, $6,612 per pupil in Binghamton, $7,924 per pupil in
Schenectady, and an astonishing $13,214 per pupil in Yonkers. Buffalo is the only high-need
district that receives more actual aid, almost $2,000 per pupil, than aid based on fiscal health.
Third, the districts that receive more aid than warranted by their fiscal health alone are,
on average, remarkably similar to the average district overall. Their average enrollment is
slightly smaller (2,160 pupils compared to 2,403 pupils), their free lunch share is slightly lower
(33.3 percent compared to 38.3 percent), and their per-pupil wealth is virtually identical. The
advantageous aid received by these districts, in other words, cannot be explained by factors
related to their fiscal health.

Using a fixed property tax rate leads to an aid program that is fair across taxpayers, since the aid
amount is based on the same tax rate (= sacrifice) in all districts. However, this type of aid system is not
fair across students unless the state makes this rate a minimum. Without this provision, which does not
exist in New York, some districts will not raise enough money to cover their cost-adjusted spending
target.
8
In these calculations, “actual state aid” includes all the state aid a district receives, not just its
foundation aid.
7

Overall, educational aid in New York State certainly has an equalizing impact, but this
impact falls far short of giving the neediest districts the aid they need to meet the state’s
implicit student performance standards.
Fiscal health is an appealing base for a state educational aid program because it
summarizes a district’s fiscal situation based on factors outside its control. By offsetting each
district’s fiscal disadvantages, an aid program based on fiscal health can play a major role in
helping New York meet its constitutional requirement to ensure that all districts provide an
adequate education.
State policy makers may, of course, want to incorporate factors other than fiscal health
into the foundation aid formula.9 Because fiscal health is such a fundamental measure of a
district’s ability to deliver a quality education at a given sacrifice by its residents, we believe
that any additional factors in the aid formula should have widespread support and a clear
justification.

We also recognize that different scholars may come up with different education cost indexes. As
discussed in our November 2017 column, we recommend the creation of an office in the New York State
Education Department with the responsibility for cost-index estimation.
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